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MOTOR VEHICLES-REVOCATION OF
DRIVER'S LICENSE
Lawrence I. Driver, Jr., had previously been convicted of
"grand larcency of an automobile.., a felony." The record did
not disclose how or by what means the larceny of the automobile
was effected. Upon receipt of the abstract of conviction the
Acting Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles under
authority of Code Section 46-416(4)1 entered an order revoking
Driver's license to operate a motor vehicle in Virginia for a
period of one year. When notice of this revocation was received,
Driver instituted a suit in equity charging that the revocation
was illegal and praying that the Commissioner be required to
reinstate his registration plates and drivers license. The Com-
missioner was enjoined from revoking Driver's license and
registration plates because of his conviction, and the former ap-
pealed contending that the stolen automobile was "used" in the
commission of the felony of grand larceny within the meaning
of the statute. Upon appeal, hed, affirmed. The purpose of
the act is to remove from the highways those drivers who en-
danger the public and who operate motor vehicles in the perpe-
tration of serious crimes. "Simply because an automobile was
stolen, it does not necessarily follow that it or any other motor
vehicle has been run,-operated, or driven, and thus 'used' in
effecting the crime." Lamb v. Driver, 196 Va. 393, 397, 83 S.E.
2d 741, 744 (1954).
The Court should have given a more liberal interpretation
to the statute. It did exactly this in Joyner v. Matthewsl where
liability was imposed on the owners of motor vehicle carriers
hauling weight in excess of the maximum provided for by Section
46-334 of the Virginia Code of 1950. The drivers had been ar-
rested and convicted in each instance under Section 46-334, and
I Va. Code §46-416 (1950): "The Commissioner shall forthwith revoke, and not there-
after reissue during the period of one year. the li.cese of any person, resident or
non-resident, upon re,-eivin a record of his convition of an of following crimes,
committed in violation of either State law or of a vald town, city, or county ordinance
paralleling and substantially conforming to a like Stat law and to all changes andamendments of it:
(4) Any crime punishable as a felony under the motor vehicle laws of this State
or any other felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used . .
' 193 Va. 10, 68 S.E.2d 127 (1951).
the Commonwealth claimed that the owners were now liable
under Section 40-338.1 for the penalties provided for "every
person, firm or corporation" convicted under Section 46-334.
The owners argued that they had never been convicted of vio-
lating Section 46-334; therefore Section 46-338.1 was not appli-
cable to them. The Court held that such a contention was not
a sound one since the owners were responsible for and caused
the violations of Section 46-334, and hence were equally guilty
with the drivers. It was held that Section 46-338.1 is a remedial
statute and should be liberally construed so as to carry into
effect the legislative will which prompted its passage.
Why should Section 46-338.1 be liberally construed and Sec-
tion 46-416(4) strictly construed? Granted that the purpose of
the Act is to remove from the highways those drivers who
endanger the public and who operate motor vehicles in the
perpetration of serious crimes, would it not be in the best inter-
est of the public to remove from the highways any person who
is convicted of the crime of grand larceny of an automobile?
Since the Court has strictly interpreted Section 40-416(4),
the statute should be re-worded to read ".. . or any other felony
in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used or which in-
volves a motor vehicle in any way."
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